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THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE-A CON· 
TROLLED TEST IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION. By Maurice Rosen-
berg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 241. $6.50. 
In one slim and readable volume Professor Maurice Rosenberg 
has rendered obsolete much of the voluminous prior literature on 
pretrial conferences. Previous commentators have argued that pre-
trials save judicial manpower;1 they have claimed that pretrials tend 
to shorten trials,2 and that settlements ari~e as a by-product of pre-
trials even when the conferences are not designed specifically to en-
courage settlements. 3 Professor Rosenberg has disproved all of these 
claims, at least as to personal injury cases. 
With the cooperation of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the 
Columbia University Project for Effective Justice conducted a con-
trolled experiment designed to test the effect of pretrial conferences 
on personal injury cases. Professor Rosenberg directed the project; 
his book is a report on the project's findings. The study deals only 
with the New Jersey form of pretrial conference, which, unlike those 
of many other sta~es, is not directly designed to foster settlements. 
Rather, it is primarily designed to shorten the length and improve the 
quality of the trial itself by such means as narrowing issues and en-
couraging stipulations. 
Under the New Jersey rules as they existed at the time of the 
study, every personal injury case was required to undergo a pretrial 
conference,4 but for the purposes of the experiment a different 
procedure was used. About three thousand personal injury cases 
were studied. For roughly fifteen hundred cases (designated "A 
cases") the mandatory pretrial procedure was continued. In the re-
maining fifteen hundred cases ("B + C cases"), a pretrial was held 
only upon request by one or more of the parties. Out of these, about 
half ("C cases") had pretrials, while the other half ("B cases") had 
none. The subsequent history of each case was recorded and statisti-
cally analyzed. 
Strictly speaking, the ~xperiment compared a mandatory pretrial 
system with a system in which a pretrial was given only if one of the 
lawyers requested it. To compare both of these with a system provid-
1. See, e.g., ABA SPECIAL COMMITT.EE ON COURT CONGESTION, T.EN CURES FOR COURT 
CONGESTION 11 (1959); NIMS, PRE-TRIAL 64-65 (1950). 
2. See, e.g., Spangenberg & Ulrich, Pre-Trial From the Viewpoints of Two Law• 
yers, 7 W. R.Es. L. REv. 418, 427 (1956); Thode, The Case for the Pre-Trial Conference 
in Texas, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 372, 384 (1957). 
3. See, e.g., Brennan, The Continuing Education of the Judiciary in Improved 
Procedures, Seminar on Practice and Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 42, 50 (1960); Brennan, 
Remar~ on Pretrial, 17 F.R.D. 479, 485 (1955). 
4. N.J. Rule 4:29-l(a) (1955). As a result of the study, New Jersey changed its 
rules so that pretrials in automobile negligence cases are no longer mandatory. N.J. 
RULES 4:29-l(a). 
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ing for no pretrials at all would require another experiment. 5 Never-
theless, Professor Rosenberg makes certain statements concerning 
pretrial conferences themselves, and does not confine his discussion 
to comparing a mandatory with a permissive system. He candidly 
acknowledges, however, that "such statements may not command 
the same level of reliability as the controlled test data."6 
Briefly summarized, the principal findings were that the man-
datory system resulted in a slightly higher proportion of well-tried 
cases, and that the mandatory system required more judges' time 
(total pretrial and trial time) than the permissive system, to dispose 
of the same number of cases. The mandatory system neither increased 
settlements nor shortened trials. From these findings it was inferred 
broadly that although pretrials do not save time, they do improve 
trial quality. 1 
Assuming that Professor Rosenberg's statistics are reliable-and 
there is every reason to believe that they are-the conclusion that 
the New Jersey type of pretrial conference does not save time in 
personal injury cases is as unassailable as it is startling, since both 
settlement rates and trial lengths are objective facts. The figures 
show that pretried cases are neither settled more frequently nor tried 
more expeditiously than non-pretried cases. It is theoretically pos-
sible, of course, that factors other than the existence or absence of 
pretrials could account for the similar trial lengths and settlement 
rates of the two groups, but this seems doubtful in view of the careful 
sampling and control techniques employed. 
Professor Rosenberg's other major finding-that pretrial con-
ferences tend to improve trial quality-is not so well supported as 
his finding concerning time saving. This is not to suggest that pre-
trials do not improve trial quality, but merely that the empirical 
evidence offered by the study in support of this conclusion is weak. 
One is faced at the outset with the question whether trial quality 
can ever be me~sured objectively. The best way to prove that it can 
would be to offer evidence tending to show that different observers 
judge trial quality (or the factors which go to make up trial quality) 
the same way. However, no such evidence was offered, and that omis-
sion seriously undermines this part of the project's conclusions. 
Even if it is assumed that the trial quality can be measured ob-
jectively, it must still be asked whether the method used in the proj-
5. The test program originally designed by the project would have compared a 
mandatory pretrial system with a system having no pretrials. It is possible that such 
an experiment, by arbitrarily treating certain litigants differently from others, might 
raise serious constitutional questions. Probably for this reason, the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey modified the proposed test design so that those not mandatorily pre• 
tried could request pretrials. See p. 17. 
6. P. 28. 
7. P. 150 n.4; see also p. 50. 
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ect was wholly reliable. Trial quality was rated by lawyers and 
judges who knew whether the case had been pretried; it is entirely 
possible that their subjective decisions as to trial quality were in-
fluenced by their own preconceptions concerning the value of pre-
trials. Even if this happened in only some of the cases, the figures 
tending to show that pretrials improved trial quality would be un-
trustworthy. It is probably impossible to arrange a large-scale experi-
ment in which the quality of trials would be measured by observers 
who did not know whether any particular case had been pretried. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the evidence is the best obtainable does 
not make it convincing. 
Even if one is willing to accept the project's figures at face value, 
still another hurdle must be overcome: do they justify the conclusion 
that pretrials improve trial quality? The project's figures, gathered 
from questionnaires filled out by the judges and counsel who partici-
pated in the cases, are as follows: 8 
Voluntarily All 
Mandatorily Not Voluntarily Voluntary 
Pretried Prettied Prctried Cases 
A B C (B+C) 
Both sides well prepared 85% 85% 81% 84% 
Theories clearly brought out 94% 92% 88% 90% 
Issues emerged clearly 91% 88% 88% 88% 
Evidence not offered on extra• 
neous or undisputed issues 82% 73% 81% 77% 
Cumulative evidence not offered 82% 80% 79% 79% 
Evidence on essential issues 
not omitted 83% 77% 66% 73% 
One may agree with the author's conclusion that a mandatory 
pretrial system (column A) produces a slightly better proportion of 
"good" trials than a voluntary pretrial system (column B + C), but 
the further conclusion that pretrials improve trial quality is at least 
open to debate. A comparison of the cases voluntarily not prettied 
(column B) with those voluntarily pretried (column C) seems to sug-
gest that if a case is voluntarily given a pretrial its chance for a good 
trial is lessened. Thus, as indicated in the table, a higher proportion 
of the non-pretried cases than of the voluntarily pretried cases were 
well prepared, brought their theories out clearly, avoided cumulative 
evidence, and avoided omitting essential evidence. 
The anomalous finding that non-pretried cases were better tried 
than voluntarily prettied cases cannot be explained by assuming that 
8. Based on Tables 1, 2, 3, and 5 at pp. 34, 35, 37, and 38. 
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they were less difficult to try well. Professor Rosenberg considered 
and rejected this possibility. In fact, the conclusion that pretrials did 
not shorten trials is based at least in part on a rejection of this 
possibility. 9 
The study was confined to personal injury cases "because their 
volume and nature made them the largest question mark in the 
pretrial picture . . . [ and] in order to keep out unknown factors 
that might confuse the findings or make the results ambiguous."10 
Pretrials are probably of greater value in less routine types of cases. 
For example, it may be that the issues in personal injury cases usu-
ally cannot be narrowed significantly. 
Like most procedural studies, this one views efficiency primarily 
from the judges' viewpoint, and does not attempt to measure the 
time burden which pretrials place on lawyers. Although the average 
pretrial takes only twenty minutes of the judge's time, it takes far 
more time for the lawyers. In addition to the time consumed in 
preparing for the pretrial, untold hours are spent by lawyers warming 
courtroom benches, waiting for their tum. It will not do to dismiss 
these wasted man-hours as a burden which the legal profession can 
well shoulder, because the burden is ultimately shifted to the public. 
Defendants' lmvyers customarily charge insurance companies seventy-
five dollars per pretrial; this added expense is eventually reflected in 
higher insurance rates. Plaintiffs' attorneys, on the other hand, 
must consider the added time and expense of a pretrial when they 
fix fees, settle cases, and refuse marginal cases as too expensive to 
litigate. Does the added burden which pretrials place on lawyers and 
their clients tend to improve the quality of trials while reducing the 
quality of justice by making it more expensive? Unfortunately, that 
question was beyond the scope of the study. 
Professor Rosenberg's experiment is the first and only one in 
which the effect of a legal rule of procedure has been treated in a 
rigorously conducted, statistically significant experiment involving 
actual cases. His findings of fact are clearly separated from his inter-
pretations of those findings; he grinds no pro- or anti-pretrial ax. The 
statistical significance of each fact and figure is presented along with 
the finding, and the reader is free to draw his own conclusions. For 
these reasons it is indisputable that The Pretrial Conference and 
Effective Justice is both an invaluable addition to the literature on 
pretrial conferences and a trail-blazing venture in empirical legal 
research. The book's treatment of the effect of pretrials on trial 
quality shows that controlled experiments in the law are fraught with 
9. P. 53; see also pp. 50, 150 n.4. 
10. P. 17. 
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difficulties and pitfalls, but its finding concerning the supposed time-
saving features of pretrials demonstrates that when the pitfalls are 
avoided, such experiments are well worth the effort. 
Edward H. Rabin, 
Assistant Professor of Law, 
Rutgers-The State University 
